We analyze the evolution of specialization in resource utilization in a mechanistically underpinned discrete-time model using the adaptive dynamics approach. We assume two nutritionally equivalent resources that in the absence of consumers grow sigmoidally towards a resource-specific carrying capacity. The consumers use resources according to the law of mass-action with rates involving trade-off. The resulting discrete-time model for the consumer population has over-compensatory dynamics. We illuminate the way non-equilibrium population dynamics affect the evolutionary dynamics of the resource consumption rates, and show that evolution to the trimorphic coexistence of a generalist and two specialists is possible due to asynchronous non-equilibrium population dynamics of the specialists. In addition, various forms of cyclic evolutionary dynamics are possible. Furthermore, evolutionary suicide may occur even without Allee effects and demographic stochasticity.
Introduction 1
Evolution of life history traits interacts with population dynamics. Espe-2 cially well this interplay is known in the case of evolution of dispersal, where 3 non-equilibrium population dynamics may forge dispersal and even enable evo- we analyze the interplay between population dynamics and the evolution of resource utilization using the adaptive dynamics approach (Metz et al., 1992 ; 1 
Geritz et al., 1998).

2
In order to enable reasonable evolutionary analysis, we base our model on in-3 dividual level processes (Rueffler et al., 2006a) . We first assume continuous-time 4 resource-consumer dynamics within breeding seasons for consumers utilizing two 5 alternative resources. With specialization between two substitutable resources, 6 a trade-off is necessarily present: a consumer may utilize both resources, but 7 the more efficiently it uses one resource, the less efficiently it is able to use the 8 other. between-season dynamics for the consumer population. We commit the major-14 ity of our analysis using a model that, in the case of only one resource, equates 15 to the discrete logistic model, which is known to exhibit a wide range of differ-16 ent population-dynamical attractors from equilibrium to chaos (e.g. Holmgren
17
(1994)). For comparison, we present also results obtained from models that 
23
The family of models we study has been extensively studied in the case of 24 equilibrium dynamics by who found three qualita-25 tively different evolutionary scenarios: evolution to a monomorphic specialist 26 population, evolutionary branching resulting in the coexistence of two specialist 27 strategies, and evolution to a monomorphic generalist population. This is in 28 line with the majority of previous results (Levins, 1962 (Levins, , 1963 ; Meszéna et al., suicide (Ferrière, 2000; Parvinen, 2005) .
40
In the presence of only one resource, it is possible to investigate the evolution 41 of the rate at which the consumer uses the resource. In this case, there are no geneous models with global dispersal, evolution to the trimorphic coexistence 
30
In this paper, we integrate the ideas concerning the adaptive dynamics un- 
where R i denotes the density of the resource and α i > 0 denotes the resource 1 renewal rate. Different resources affect each other only via shared consumers. 2 We assume that between breeding seasons resource populations recover to their 3 carrying capacities independent of the usage during previous seasons.
4
The consumers use resources according to the law of mass action. The con- hatch.
17
When we, furthermore, assume that the resource dynamics are fast compared 18 to the consumer dynamics such that the resources are always at the quasi- 
where λ i ∈ R + are compound parameters that depend on the details of the 24 within season dynamics (Geritz and Kisdi, 2004) .
25
In order to illuminate the differences between specialists and generalists we 26 assume that the resources are nutritionally equivalent (λ 1 = λ 2 = λ) and renew 27 in equal rate (α 1 = α 2 = α). In this case, both λ and α can be scaled out and,
28
for several consumers, equation (2) takes form
where f (s, S, X n ) is the fecundity of a strategy s individual when strategies S =
30
(s (1) , s (2) , . . . , s (k) ) are present with population sizes X n = (x prising strategies S = (s (1) , s (2) , . . . , s (k) ) has settled to an attractor X =
7
(X 1 , X 2 , . . . X n , . . .), where each X n is the vector of the population sizes at 8 time n as above. Then
If r(s, S, X) > 0, a mutant with strategy s is able to invade the resident popula-10 tion. In practice, it is possible to calculate fitness only in the case of p-periodic 11 resident population dynamics. In this case,
Some analytic results can be derived even without specifying the resource 
This formula is not defined for θ = 0, but since lim θ→0 β(s) = s it is natural to β(s) = s θ , but avoid artificial singularities in the borders of the strategy space.
6
The derivative of r(s, S, X) with respect to the mutant strategy s (fitness 7 gradient), determines the direction of evolution in a monomorphic population.
8
The points where the fitness gradient vanishes are called evolutionarily singular 9
strategies. There exists no directional evolution at a singular strategy. Other parameter values:
diagrams illustrated in Figure 2 . The generalist strategy turns from a branching in Figure 2 are such that the population is not viable due to low resource intake: is that the population-dynamical attractor drops discontinuously from a viable Evolutionary time Figure 2 : Evolutionary bifurcation diagrams in the case of equilibrium population dynamics. Singular strategies as a function of the trade-off parameter θ. Thin black curve indicates evolutionary repellors, thick grey curve branching points and thick black curve evolutionarily stable strategies. The arrows indicate the direction of evolution in a monomorphic population. In the black-colored parameter domain, the population is not viable due to low resource intake. Other parameter values:
In the case of equilibrium population dynamics (Figure 2 ), the transition to eter K 1 similarly to the logistic recurrence equation the population growth is fast enough to exhaust resource 1 (see equation (2)).
18
Furthermore, note that the trade-off parameter θ does not affect the population 19 dynamics of a monomorphic population of devoted specialist since β(1) = 1 20 independent of θ. Analogous results hold for strategy s = 0 specialists.
21
For an unbiased generalist strategy (which is singular if
attractor type is analogously determined by the sum β(0.5)( become exhausted because high resource carrying capacities and the additional 1 benefit of generalism result in overly fast consumer population growth.
2 Figure 4 illustrates the population-dynamical attractors as a function of 3 the specialization strategy s. In Figure 4A , the transitions to extinction at the simulation procedure). In Figure 5A , devoted specialists have equilibrium 16 population dynamics, whereas in Figure 5B , they have chaotic dynamics.
17
We are not aware of any algebraic means for calculating fitness under chaotic time would be substantial.
Population sizes Continuous transition to extinction when the resource carrying capacities are low such that, due to the additional cost of generalism, the resource intake by generalists is not high enough to maintain viability of the population (cf. Figure 2 ).
Panel B:
Specialists have equilibrium population dynamics but, due to the additional benefit of generalism (θ > 0), generalists have chaotic population dynamics (cf. Figure 5A ).
Panel C:
Specialists have chaotic population dynamics but the usage of two resources together with the additional cost of generalism stabilizes the population dynamics (cf. Figure  5B ). Panel D: Discontinuous transition to extinction. High resource carrying capacities and additional benefit of generalism accelerate the growth of the consumer population. Finally resources are exhausted and the consumer population goes abruptly extinct. Note, that biased usage of two resources may still stabilize population dynamics (cf. Figure 5B ).
Other parameter values α 1 = α 2 = 1, λ 1 = λ 2 = 1.
All the simulations illustrated in Figure 5 start with an initially monomor-1 phic population with a random initial strategy and population size. When an 2 evolutionary simulation ends in a monomorphic population, we illustrate this 3 endpoint using a -sign. When evolutionary branching takes place, we illustrate 4 the strategies present at the end of the simulation using * -signs. Since all the 5 simulations are run over only a finite time, it is possible that some of them have
6 not yet reached an evolutionarily stable strategy.
7
The parameter domains colored black in Figure 5 are such that the pop-8 ulation is not viable. In Figure 5A this unviability is caused by low resource 9 intake (see Figure 4A ), and as explained above, evolutionary suicide is not pos- before extinction in an evolutionary simulation.
19
When the resource consumption function is sufficiently convex (the trade-off 20 parameter θ low), the evolution of specialization leads to a population compris-
21
ing one or two devoted specialist strategies both under equilibrium population does not evolve to the coexistence of two devoted specialists. Next we discuss 36 these two cases in detail. When the strategies s (1) and s (2) in a dimorphic population are symmetric
, and the environment is symmetric (
directly from equation (3), that the diagonal
n , then also x
n+1 .
43
Such an in-phase orbit is called a symmetric orbit. It is possible to show al-
44
gebraically (See the Appendix) that in such a case, the dimorphic population Thin black curve indicates evolutionary repellors, thick grey curve branching points and thick black curve evolutionarily stable strategies. The arrows indicate the direction of evolution in a monomorphic population. In the black-colored parameter domain, the population is not viable. In the grey-colored parameter domain, the monomorphic population dynamics are (nearly) chaotic. If an evolutionary simulation ends in a monomorphic population, the end-strategy is denoted by . If it ends in a dimorphic or polymorphic population, the strategies comprising the endpoint are denoted by * -signs. If evolutionary suicide occurs, the last viable strategy is denoted by †-sign. The corresponding population dynamics are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 . Panel A: Specialists have equilibrium population dynamics but high benefit of generalism enables non-equilibrium population dynamics for generalists when θ is sufficiently large. Panel B: Specialists have chaotic population dynamics. Biased usage of two resources may stabilize population dynamics, but high benefit of generalism enables chaotic dynamics and even evolutionary suicide.
Other parameter values:
always evolves towards the coexistence of the two devoted specialists given that 1 the resource consumption function is convex. This result holds also for other 2 models with similar underpinnings, e.g., the Ricker model (8).
3
When evolutionary branching occurs, the dimorphic population "inherits" its 4 population-dynamical attractor from the preceding monomorphic population.
5
For example, if the monomorphic population was on a two-periodic population-6 dynamical attractor, the dimorphic population is, immediately after branching, on attractor inheritance. Corresponding phenomenon has also been observed by 9 Hoyle et al. (2011)). Thus, after evolutionary branching in a symmetric envi-10 ronment, the dimorphic population is always initially on a symmetric attractor. • In the symmetric case s
(1) = 1 − s (2) the evolutionary forces acting on 25 these strategies are also symmetric, which means that average evolution- similarly to the case with equilibrium dynamics ( Figure 1B ).
37
• The population remains dimorphic, but does not evolve to devoted spe- In order to illuminate how the population dynamics affect the evolution-1 ary dynamics, we need to illustrate the population-dynamical attractors during 2 the evolutionary time together with the evolutionary tree in the strategy space. (2) , . . . , s (k) ) are present at time unit n with pop-
n , . . . , x (k) n ), then the availabilities A 1 (n) and A 2 (n) of the 10 resources R 1 and R 2 , respectively, are
When the population is on a non-equilibrium attractor, these availabilities 
0 , x
responds to this unit of evolutionary time, can then be calculated iteratively 33 using equation (3) (for 20 steps in Figure 6 ). Furthermore, we can calculate 34 the corresponding resource availabilities A 1 (n) and A 2 (n) using equation (6) 35 and calculate their sum A 1 (n) + A 2 (n) and difference A 1 (n) − A 2 (n) for each Figure 6C , we plot the difference of the resource 40 availabilities in a similar way, and in Figure 6D , we plot the availability A 1 of 41 resource 1.
1
In Figure 6 , evolutionary branching takes place while the population is on a 2 two-periodic attractor. As a consequence, after branching the dimorphic popu-3 lation is on an in-phase two-periodic orbit, i.e. it is on a symmetric attractor.
4
However, as the two branches specialize further, this population-dynamical at-5 tractor becomes unstable, and the population switches to a new, four-periodic 6 out-of-phase orbit (which is asymmetric). This creates asynchrony to the avail-7 abilities of the resources, which in turn, benefits generalism and stops the evolu-8 tion towards specialism. Finally, evolution leads to a dimorphic singular strategy
Also Figure 7 illustrates the result of an evolutionary simulation, where evo- to the simulation illustrated in Figure 6 , the population dynamics in Figure   13 7 are chaotic, which ensures that the symmetry of the attractors in the di- However, the population does not settle to any evolutionarily singular strategy 
28
In Figure 7 , population-dynamical attractor switching sometimes affects the that balances its effects.
37
In Figure 5B , we observe evolutionary dynamics described above (Figure Evolutionary time Evolutionary time 
In Figure 5B 
32
The out-of-phase orbit maintains its population-dynamical stability during the 33 second branching and, finally, the population comprises the unbiased generalist sponding devoted specialist. In Figure 9B , the carrying capacity of resource 2 is Evolutionary time Thin black curve indicates evolutionary repellors, thick grey curve branching points and thick black curve evolutionarily stable strategies. The arrows indicate the direction of evolution in a monomorphic population. In the black-colored parameter domain, the population is not viable. In the grey-colored parameter domain, the monomorphic population dynamics are (nearly) chaotic. If an evolutionary simulation ends in a monomorphic population, the end-strategy is denoted by .
If it ends in a dimorphic or polymorphic population, the strategies comprising the endpoint are denoted by * -signs. If evolutionary suicide occurs, the last viable strategy is denoted by †-sign.
higher. This stabilizes the population dynamics when consumers are partially however, able to survive due to their ability to use resource 2. The population 12 sizes of almost devoted resource 1 specialists will, naturally, drop to very low val-13 ues. However, since resource 1 recovers the next time unit after being exhausted, 14 all the strategies that survived will start to increase in population size again. any reasonable simulation procedure.
19
When the evolution of a monomorphic population directs towards an evolu- (2003)). This process is 26 illustrated in Figure 10B . Note that cyclic evolution does not have an endpoint.
27
Therefore in Figure 10A , we have chosen such a procedure for evolutionary sim-
28
ulations that evolutionary suicide is not possible. In Figure 10B , the simulation
29
procedure is chosen such that evolutionary suicide is possible.
30
Note furthermore that, the mechanisms described above may, also in the evo- Trade-off parameter Evolutionary time according to the Gompertz equation
one obtains the famous Ricker (1954) model that, in the case of two resources
7
(with α 1 = α 2 = 1) and k consumer strategies, has the form
where the notations correspond to the ones in equation (3) 
20
Under equilibrium population dynamics, the evolutionary dynamics in the
21
Ricker model are qualitatively similar to those of the logistic model (illustrated
22
in Figure 2 ). Figure 11 illustrates the evolutionary dynamics in the Ricker Figure 5 ). There are, however, some differences. The most 26 obvious one is that the complete exhaustion of the resources is not possible in the
27
Ricker model (compare equations (3) and (8) Figures 5B and 11 is that the bifurcation structure in the parameter domain parameter values (e.g. λ = 1.1 and other parameters as in Figure 5B ).
36
Similarly to the logistic model, also in the Ricker model, there exists a pa- 1 −6 −4 0 2 2 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * θ Figure 11 : Evolutionary bifurcation diagram of the Ricker model with possibly chaotic population dynamics. Singular strategies and endpoints of evolutionary simulations as a function of the trade-off parameter θ. Thin black curve indicates evolutionary repellors, thick grey curve branching points and thick black curve evolutionarily singular strategies. The arrows indicate the direction of evolution in a monomorphic population. In the grey-colored parameter domain, the monomorphic population dynamics are (nearly) chaotic. If an evolutionary simulation ends in a monomorphic population, the end-strategy is denoted by , else the strategies comprising the endpoint are denoted by * -signs.
Other parameter values: (6)). For each evolutionary time unit, panel B illustrates the sum of the resources availabilities during each step on the population-dynamical attractor. Panel C illustrates the differences of the resource availabilities on the population-dynamical attractor for each evolutionary time unit. Parameter values as in Figure 11 with θ = −2.8.
Discussion
1
In this paper, we have examined the evolution of resource specialization 2 under non-equilibrium population dynamics. We use a model that is mechanis- • In our evolutionary analysis, we focus exclusively on the resource con- 
16
• Our previous results concerning the evolution of specialization under equi- should study also the consequences of non-equilibrium population dynam-
20
ics for the joint evolution of dispersal and specialization in metapopulation 21 models.
22
• We assume rather simple resource dynamics. However, the evolutionary 23 changes in the consumer strategies are likely to cause evolutionary changes 24 also in the resource populations resulting in co-evolution of resources and 25 consumers (see e.g. Abrams (2000) and references therein).
26
• Our evolutionary analysis is based on clonal reproduction and the rather 27 simple genetic architecture assumed by the adaptive dynamics approach.
28
There are several studies indicating that the phenotypic models of evo- ditional singular strategies may appear due to the non-equilibrium dynamics.
18
Similar phenomena is present in our model: evolution to the dimorphic sin- It is also noteworthy that we observed evolution to the trimorphic coexis- tion is everywhere convex (see e.g. Figure 5A ). In metapopulation models with 40 equilibrium local dynamics, evolution to a singular strategy pair has been ob- and/or K 2 ). Evolutionary suicide may take place via generalist strategies (e.g.
Figure 5B) or via a specialist strategy (Figure 10 ). In the former case, both 1 resources are exhausted simultaneously, and all the strategies are wiped out.
2
This extinction occurs in all reasonable evolutionary simulation procedures. In our results, Abrams (1992 Abrams ( , 2000 concluded that increasing prey/resource carry-
28
ing capacity increased the probability for non-equilibrium population dynamics.
29
In fact, our results relate to the paradox of enrichment (Rosenzweig, 1971) 4. Pick one strategy that will mutate. The probability to pick a certain optimal way. The actual simulations did run much longer than the illustrated evolutionary time interval in order ensure that the system has really reached its 1 evolutionary endpoint (which can never be guaranteed, however). 1 specialists in Figure 10 ). 
